p. 297, ¶ 1– “William J. Brennan, Jr. And William H. Rehnquist served together on the United States Supreme Court between 1972 and 1990. During these eighteen years, they headed the Court’s liberal and conservative wings, and lobbied for the votes of moderate judges.”

Ibid., ¶ 5– “Brennan and Rehnquist are almost totally opposite in background, philosophy and judicial voting.”

p. 298, ¶ 1– “As Brennan put it, ‘Due process required fidelity to a more basic and more subtle principle: the essential dignity and worth of each individual.’”

Ibid., ¶ 2– “Another central theme of Brennan’s judicial philosophy is that ‘due process’ is a concept whose meaning is not static, frozen by the Framers in 1787, but one that changes over time, as society changes.”

Ibid., ¶ 4– “In Brennan’s view, judges have the power and, in appropriate cases, the duty to displace majority rule when it violates the rights of minorities.”

Ibid., ¶ 5– “This defense of minority rights does not lead Justice Brennan to advocate replacing what he calls legislative ‘imperialism’ with an equivalent judicial imperialism. The Constitution does not empower judges to impose their own personal values on its provisions.”

p. 299, ¶ 3– “Brennan agrees that allowing unelected judges to reverse the decisions of elected lawmakers goes against the grain of democratic government.”

Ibid., ¶ 4– “He [Brennan] cites as examples of ‘panic’ by majorities the prosecution of those who criticized American involvement in both world wars.”

Ibid., ¶ 5– “In summary, Justice Brennan’s judicial philosophy begins with his deep religious faith in the ‘dignity’ of every person, moves to the principle that government exist to serve the needs of individuals and to protect their dignity, and ends with the notion that the meaning of the Constitution must change as society changes.”

Ibid., ¶ 5– “William Rehnquist came to the bench with a clear, consistent political and legal philosophy, but without a judicial record that would show his philosophy in action.”

p. 300, ¶ 2– “His [Rehnquist] speech explicitly adopted the position of legal positivism, the notion that the legislative will is supreme and that the content of laws is not a proper concern of judges. If legislators follow the rules, they are constrained only by the explicit commands of the Constitution.”