p. 283, ¶ 2—“Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive that, in a
government in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions,
will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in
the capacity to annoy or injure them. The executive not only dispenses the honors but holds the sword
of the community. The legislature not only commands the purse but prescribes the rules by which the
duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated.” [The whole ¶ is essential.]

p. 284, ¶ 1—“It proves incontestably that the judiciary that the judiciary is beyond comparison the
weakest of the three departments of power.”

Ibid.—“It equally proves that though individual oppression may now and then proceed from the courts
of justice, the general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter; I mean so long as
the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislature and the executive

Ibid., ¶ 2—“The compete independence of the courts of just is peculiarly essential in a limited
Constitution.”

Ibid., ¶ 3—“Some perplexity respecting the rights of the courts to pronounce legislative acts void,
because contrary to the Constitution, has arisen from an imagination that the doctrine would imply
superiority of the judiciary to legislative power.”

p. 285, ¶ 1—“No legislative act, therefore contrary to the Constitution, can be valid.”

Ibid., ¶ 3—“Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the
legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to both, and that where the
will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the
Constitution, the judges ought be governed by the latter rather than the former.”

N.B—This article has so many important parts it should be read at least twice in its entirety.