p. 249, introduction/abstract, line 3 – “Presidents select a small number (a few thousand) of high-level people to head the executive branch agencies. Among those appointments are cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and the like. The rest of those who work in the executive branch are civil servants, chosen for government jobs by merit exams, and they remain in government service for many years, even decades.”

Ibid., introduction/abstract, line 9 – “Helco identifies the often-unseen tension between a president’s appointees and the bureaucrats.”

Ibid., ¶ 1, line 1 – “Every new administration gives fresh impetus to an age-old struggle between change and continuity, between political leadership an bureaucratic power. Bureaucrats have a legitimate interest in maintaining the integrity of government programs and organizations.”

Ibid., ¶ 2, line 1 – “The search for effective political leadership in a bureaucracy of responsible career officials has become extraordinarily difficult in Washington.”

p. 250, ¶ 1, line 1 – “Congress is widely thought to have lost power to the executive branch, but congressional rather than executive behavior remains a major preoccupation in political research. Observers acknowledge that no president can cope with more than a tiny fraction of the decisionmaking in government...”

Ibid., ¶ 4, line 1 – “...The administrative machinery in Washington represents a number of fragmented power centers rather than a set of subordinate unites under the President.”

Ibid., ¶ 4, line 6 – “People in the White House are aware of those subgovernments but have no obvious control over them.”

Ibid., ¶ 5, line 1 – “...Political executives who try to exercise leadership within government may encounter intense opposition that they can neither avoid nor reconcile.”

Ibid., ¶ 5, line 7 – “Many... sincerely believe in their bureau’s purpose and feel they must protect its
jurisdiction, programs, and budget at all costs.”

p. 251, ¶ 2, line 1 – “The structure of most bureaucratic sabotage has been characterized as an ‘iron triangle’ uniting a particular government bureau, its relevant interest group, and congressional supporters.”

Ibid., ¶ 3, line 1 – “The common features of these subgovernments are enduring mutual interests across the executive and legislative branches and between the public and private sectors.”

Ibid., ¶ 4, line 1 – “Often sabotage is unrecognizable because of the virtually invisible ways civil servants can act in bad faith toward political executives.”

p. 252, ¶ 3, line 1 – “Political appointees can sometimes encounter much more vigorous forms of sabotage. These range from minor needling to massive retaliation.”

p. 254, ¶ after quote, line 1 – “[W]hile academics write about the iron triangle as if it were an immutable force, prudent political executives recognize that although they cannot stop bureaucratic sabotage, neither are they helpless against it.”

p. 255, last ¶, line 1 – “Thus the political executives’ own positive efforts are the necessary – if not always sufficient – condition for combating sabotage. Since some bureaucratic subversion is an ever-present possibility and since punishment is difficult, the government executives’ real choice is to build and use their political relationships or forfeit most other strategic resources for leadership.”

Note: This is precisely the struggle that was exposed by FEMA’s inability to deal with the scope of the crisis caused by Hurricane Katrina. Long-term public servants who had worked at FEMA were excluded from decisionmaking, many resigning in frustration, and when a crisis of such momentous proportions arose, the political appointments were unable to meet the challenge.