p. 162, ¶ 3—“The Senate has always operated under rules that vest enormous power in each individual senator.”

p. 163, ¶ 2—“The claim that the Senate is a unique legislative chamber rests on the Senate’s highly permissive rules concerning floor debate and amending activity.”

Ibid., ¶ 3—“The Senate has... several times altered its debate rules, and the circumstances of its doing so are illuminating.”

Ibid., ¶ 4—“The rule has been changed several times since. Most importantly, in 1975 the threshold for cutting off debate on legislation was reduced to three-fifths of the total membership (usually sixty), though stopping debate on a proposal to change Senate rules still requires a two-thirds vote...”

p. 146 – Note the chart on “The Increase in Filibusters and Cloture Votes.”

p. 164, ¶ 2—“From the late 1930s to the late 1960s, when filibustering was strongly associated with civil rights, filibusters were aimed primarily at killing legislation.”

Ibid., ¶ 3—“With the growth of Senate individualism and senators’ increasing exploitation of their prerogatives under Senate rules, the uses to which senators put their powers multiplied. Killing legislation continued to be the aim in many cases, but filibustering also came to be used almost routinely to extract concessions on legislation.”

p. 165, ¶ 2—“Certainly since the development of the individualist Senate, senators as individuals have used extended debate, directly and indirectly, to try to kill legislation that they strongly oppose, and they continue to do today...”

p. 166, ¶ 3—“The hold system is an informal practice, not a matter of Senate rules, and its history is murky.

Ibid., ¶ 4—“Visible filibusters are not just the tip of the iceberg.”

p. 167, ¶ 2—“Thus, often simply to get to the floor, a measure must command a substantial supermajority.”

Ibid., ¶ 3—“If a majority is willing to pay the price in time and inconvenience, a single senator or a handful cannot stop a majority from bringing a measure to the floor and passing it.”
Ibid., ¶ 4– “The Senate... has become a major choke point in the legislative process...”

Ibid., ¶ 6– “Yet the combination of partisanship ans individualism does make the legislative process in the Senate fragile and subject to breakdown.”