Chapter Five

p. 96, ¶ 1, line 5 – “On June 9 the convoluted and inconclusive discussion on the executive had petered out, and the delegates moved to the heart of the matter: Who would be represented in the lawmaking branch, and how?”

p. 97, ¶ 2, line 3 – “Slowly but surely, Madison, Hamilton, Gourverneur Morris, and James Wilson – the central figures in the do-or-die nationalist circle – had drawn the Pinckneys and Rufus King into their embrace, and by the time the committee of the whole began its confused efforts to sort out the executive branch, a solid bloc of Virginia Plan advocates had been created from Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, the Carolinas, Georgia – and Hamilton.”

p. 98, ¶ 1, line 2 – “Unlike Charles C. Pinckney or James Madison, who had both mulled over the flaws of the Confederation, consulted republics of the past and philosophers of the present, and sketched out detailed blueprints for a new government, most delegates had taken their seats in the East Room with a general sense that they were there to fix what was wrong – and go home to persuade their constituents that what they had done was right. The only caveats they all acknowledged were that they must do it in a manner that did not insult the republican inclinations of Americans and did not do damage to the welfare of their own state.”

p. 98, ¶ 2, last sentence – “Fortunately for the nation, the framers were accomplished politicians.”

p. 98, ¶ 3, line 3 – “First, representation in the legislature had to be based on population rather than on the principle of equality among the states, large and small. They demanded proportional representation, or simply put, the more citizens a state had, the more voices it was entitled to in the legislature.”

p. 99, ¶ 1, line 2 – “The Union was a government of the people not of the states. It was to make this point even clearer that they pressed for their second goal: the right of the national legislature to veto any state law.”
“Dickenson had no desire to preserve the Confederation, but he had no desire to see the equality of the states sent to oblivion with it.”

“Dickenson’s definition of nationalism was a far cry, it appeared, from Madison’s; for him, it meant establishing a central government powerful enough to end the bullying of some states by others.”

“Madison’s vision also disturbed those delegates from large states who had no wish to preside over the death of the states. Among them were certainly men who ‘thought locally’ rather than continentally, men whose loyalty radiated out from their county or parish to their state government, weakening as it stretched to the national scene. But their ranks also included men who believed that the best representative of the people’s interests was their state government and the best role for the national government was as a forum in which the states could gather.”

“Despite the impassioned arguments of William Paterson, the committee of the whole voted on June 11 in favor of proportional representation in the Senate as well as the House.”

“Although it was the work of one man, the New Jersey Plan expressed the sentiments of a group of delegates, drawn from the small northern states, who would soon constitute and opposition bloc to Hamilton and Madison’s already firm established coalition.”

“James Wilson led the assault on the New Jersey Plan.”

“Together Roger Sherman, Paterson, and their colleagues from Delaware and the large–state renegade, New York, hammered out a compromise proposal: a bicameral congress, one house based on proportional representation, the other ensuring equal representation for the states. There was nothing new in this Connecticut Compromise. In fact, Roger Sherman had proposed something remarkably similar to the Continental Congress in 1776.”

“What the purpose of the Senate served proved to be another. Was it simply a mechanism to diffuse power, another example of checks and balances designed to prevent the rise of an
oligarchy or a tyrant? Or should the men who sat in the Senate represent some particular minority interest within the society—the propertied classes?” [Take special note of the remainder of the ¶]

p. 104, ¶ 2, line 1 – “Morris’s bald assertion that America did indeed have an economic and social elite and that its intentions were, if natural, still predatory sat badly with the delegates. Even Madison, who would defend the rights of this elite minority against the envy and passions of the less prosperous majority in his Federalist #10, cringed at so naked a description of his own social circle.”

p. 107, ¶ 1, line 3 – “With the critical vote on proportional representation in the lower house approaching, and the danger that the convention would dissolve soon afterward, a desperate Benjamin Franklin moved that a chaplain be invited to open the next day’s deliberation with a prayer. When the country’s oldest Deist issued an appeal for religious intervention, it was obvious the convention had entered its darkest hour.”

p. 107, ¶ 2, line 1 – “On June 29 Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, and Delaware cast their votes in the convention against proportional representation in the House. Maryland’s delegates were divided. Six states reaffirmed the recommendations of the committee of the whole.”

p. 110, ¶ 2, line 1 – “As Baldwin saw it, Georgia’s interests were tied to three major considerations. The first was how to thwart any attempt by northerners to end slavery. It was this concern that had brought Georgia into the Madison camp.”

p. 110, ¶ 2, line 12 – “Georgia needed the military and diplomatic protection of a strong central government, and Baldwin intended to do nothing that endangered the success of the convention certain to produce that government.”

p. 111, ¶ 1, line 1 – “They would bolt the convention if proportional representation was established in both houses of Congress. Weighing all this, Baldwin cast his own vote with the small states.”

p. 111, ¶ 2, line 18 – “Virginia’s committee member was not Madison but George Mason, who by July was openly voicing his doubts about the extreme nationalists’ attack on state sovereignty.”
p. 112, ¶ 2, the whole ¶ – “On Monday, July 16, the long ordeal ended. When the vote came...” [through the end of the ¶]

p. 112, ¶ 3, the whole ¶ – “Madison had lost the battle for of his two major reforms...” [through the end of the ¶]

p. 113, ¶ 1, line 4 – “It was not a debate over the continuation of slavery or over the three-fifths formula for including slaves in the population base for the House, for neither of these issues was especially controversial. The Confederation had operated on the three-fifths formula, and, arbitrary though it was, it was familiar enough to the delegates to be acceptable.”

p. 113, ¶ 2, line 4 – “The southern delegates, especially those from South Carolina, wanted the convention’s assurances that the slave trade could continue, at least for some time, and that African or Caribbean blacks brought to America would be considered taxable imports.”

p. 114, ¶ 2, line 1 – “The Great Compromise, as the vote on July 16 came to be called, ushered in a new spirit at the convention. It became clear that men were tired and missed their families and their own beds.”

p. 114, ¶ 2, last sentence – “Increasingly, the convention preferred to send thorny problems and even potentially troublesome ones to committees where compromises could be worked out. And increasingly they relied on committees to fill in the details of their grand design.”