Rowe on Anselm’s Ontological Argument

First, consider the main points of Cartwright's article "Negative Existentials". The key idea in that article is that trying to deny the existence of something (or, assert a negative existential, such as "Unicorns do not exist") seems to be problematical. It seems that no negative existential statement can possibly be true, but we know that there are many true negative existentials. If it were impossible to avoid implying the existence of something in the very act of denying its existence, the problem would be insurmountable. We would be left with the absurd result that absolutely everything of which one may speak exists. (Compare Parmenides!) Santa Claus exists just because we deny his existence. Martians and ghosts exist even if we are mistaken in asserting their existence. What is to be done about this apparent problem?

Inflationists say we must admit a distinction between Being and Existence. To say that something is, or that there are K’s is not the same as asserting that a thing exists or that K’s exist. It is no contradiction to say that there are some things that do not exist. It is not at all illogical to speak of there being mythological creatures or fictional characters, since we may make many true statements about them , including enumerations and comparisons. For example, it is true that unicorns have exactly one horn growing from their heads and four legs. Surely it would be false to say that unicorns are hornless. It is true that unicorns have more legs than satyrs. It is also true to say that unicorns might have existed even if they do not happen to exist. The distinction between Being and existence also helps make sense of the fact that we seem to know many facts about purely abstract things like numbers and shapes. We know that, for every odd number, there is an even number. We seem to know that there are infinitely many numbers and shapes. Indeed, how can we reasonably deny that there are numbers that are larger than any one has ever counted or shapes that have never been exemplified by any existing thing? Do we want to say that all these numbers and shapes exist in just the same sense of the word that we use when we say that stones and horses exist?

Deflationists argue that there is absolutely no need to made the distinction between Being and existence. The inflationist’s mistake is that he is misled by the fact that negative existentials seem to be referring to or mentioning things, when in fact they are not. It may seem that we are referring to things with horns and legs and hooves, etc. when we deny the existence of unicorns but we really are not referring to any such things. When we say that unicorns do not exist, we are not referring to any creatures any more than we are referring to a particular person when we say that the average plumber has 1.24 children. That is really just a

Cartwright/Rowe, pg. 2

convenient way of talking about the ratio of the number of plumbers to the number of plumber’s children. In the same way, when we say that there are no unicorns, what we are really talking about are things that do exist. One deflationist alternative (that of the older Bertrand Russell) is that we are really talking

about certain kinds of linguistic objects, propositional functions (or incomplete statements) such as “... is a unicorn”. And we are saying of this combination of words that no real name of anything, when placed in the blank space at the beginning, would turn the propositional function into a true proposition . That is the safe way to understand the negative existential “There are no unicorns”.

Another deflationist strategy is to say that negative existentials are really about such things as concepts or properties. We are saying that nothing falls under the concept “unicorn”. Or, that nothing exemplifies the property of being a unicorn. Inventing the distinction between Being and Existence doesn’t really solve the problems of negative existentials, according to deflationists, and, they say, we can explain how they can be true by interpreting them as all really being about things that do exist.

According to Rowe, Anselm’s Ontological argument involves a distinction that is different from the distinction made by the inflationists between Being and Existence. It is the distinction between existence in the Understanding and existence in Reality. Anselm’s distinction tries to clear up the inflationist ‘s notion of Being. What sort of things could nonexistent things be? What sort of status could they have? Anselm maintains that, instead of talking about non-existent things, period, we should speak in terms of things which exist only in the understanding. There are two forms or modes of existence. We should not speak of something as being nonexistent, period. Anselm seems to be saying that doing nothing abut the problem will lead to insurmountable paradox. But both strategies of the inflationists and the deflationists are also deeply implausible. Anselm thought that it is quite clear, what it is for something to exist in the understanding. And, he thought, it is also clear how the very same thing may exist in the understanding at the same time that it exists in reality. A very great advantage of using his distinction, Anselm seems to be saying, is that his distinction provides the explanation of why it is so problematical to refer to, speak about or mention nonexisting things. It is because, in order to refer to or speak about something, we must first have thought of it, have it in mind. It is very clearly impossible to think of something without having that thing in mind, or in one’s understanding. It also enables us to make clear distinctions between contingent things, necessary things, possible things and impossible things. Contingent things are those which might exist either in the understanding or in reality or both. A necessary thing is one which exists both in the understanding and in reality and could not exist only in the understanding. A possible thing is one which is either contingent or necessary . An impossible thing (such as a round square) is one which exists only in the understanding and could not exist in reality. Given these distinctions, the way is clear for Anselm to make his famous argument for the existence of God.

(1) God exists in the understanding

(2) God is that than which nothing greater is possible. (Definition of 'God")

(3) God might exist in reality ( is a possible being)

(4) If something exists only in the understanding and might also have existed in reality, then it might have been greater than it is.

(5) Suppose God exists only in the understanding.

(6) God might have been greater than he is. (2, 3, 4)

(7) God is a being than which a greater is possible. (5)

(8) The being than which none greater is possible is a being than which a greater is possible.((5) and (2))

(9) It is false that God exists only in the understanding. (2, not-7 , 4)

(10) God exists in reality as well as in the understanding. (1, 8)