"Phenomenal Experience and the Measure of Information"
This paper defends the hypothesis that phenomenal experiences may be
very complex information states. This can explain some of our most
perplexing anti-physicalist intuitions about phenomenal experience.
The approach is to describe some basic facts about information in such
a way as to make clear the essential oversight involved, by way
illustrating how various intuitive arguments against physicalism (such
as Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument, and Thomas Nagel's Bat
Argument) can be interpreted to show that phenomenal information is
not different in kind from physical information, but rather is just
more information than we typically attribute to our understanding of a
physical theory. I clarify how this hypothesis is distinct from
Nagel's claim that the theory of consciousness may be inconceivable,
and then in conclusion briefly describe how these results might
suggest a positive and conservative physicalist account of phenomenal
Erkenntnis, Volume 66, Number 3, May 2007, pp. 329-352.