"Commitment and Attunement"
Heidegger's view of attunement, and evolutionary theories of emotion,
would appear to be wholly independent accounts of affects. This paper
argues that we can understand the phenomenology of attunement and the
evolutionary functionalist theory of emotions as distinct perspectives
on those same emotions. The reason that the two perspectives are
distinct is that some affects can act as commitment mechanisms, and
this requires them to be experienced in a way that obscures their
ultimate functional role. These perspectives are potentially mutually
consistent, however, and being aware of both may provide insight for
productive research programs. Although there are conflicts between
the methods and background assumptions of these two approaches, I
argue that we should allow these conflicts to stand if the outcome of
interaction is productive.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, December 2014, Volume
13, Issue 4, pp 579-594.