The hypothesis that some moods are emotions has been
rejected in philosophy, and is an unpopular alternative in psychology.
This is because there is wide agreement that moods have a number of
features distinguishing them from emotions. These include lack of an
intentional object and the related notion of lack of a goal; being of
long duration; having pervasive or widespread effects; and having
causes rather than reasons. Leading theories of mood have tried to
explain these purported features by describing moods as global changes
in the mind affecting such things as predispositions to holding
certain beliefs or the thresholds for triggering a range of relevant
behaviors. I show instead that our best understanding of emotions can
show that basic emotions either have or can appear to have each of
these features. Thus, a plausible hypothesis is that certain moods
are emotions. This theory is more parsimonious than the global change
theories, and for this reason is to be preferred as an explanation of
Philosophical Psychology, 19 (4): 527-538.