PHL471: Philosophy of Mind
Professor: Craig DeLancey
Office: CC217
Email: delancey@oswego.edu



Past Assignments
Part 1. Beginning ontology. The question of mind. Aristotle; Descartes. 2 September.
Two readings and a homework.

(1) From Aristotle's De Anima, please look at Book II part 1 (this is very short); an online version is this one at MIT.

(2) Then, please read or review Descartes's Meditations 6. (If you've not read the Meditations, try to take the time to read them all, in order.) Translations on the web can be found at http://www.classicallibrary.org/descartes/meditations/ and http://www.wright.edu/cola/descartes/mede.html and http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/descartes/meditations/meditations.html.

(3) HOMEWORK! Bring me to hand in your summary of what you think Descartes's arguments are for believing that the mind is not a physical thing. He has several arguments to this effect in Meditation 6, and they largely occur in the last third of that Meditation; try to summarize or describe them. You can do this in one page or a tiny bit more -- typed please.

Also, this is optional but helpful: send me a digital head shot, via email to delancey@oswego.edu. Name the file after yourself. For example, you can name it "JoeSmith.jpg." If you don't have a digital camera or don't know anyone who has one, let me know. Thanks! NOTE: I can't know who the photo is of if you send it from your cellphone without adding some kind of text message! -- it arrives with an ID like 1313125736

Part 2. Ontology and Theory. Lucretius; Hobbes.

9 September.
A homework.

I will give you on September 4 a handout with a set of puzzles for you to solve. I will also post them here. Answers will be due at the beginning of class.

I've been asked about the rules. They apply only to the letters given. That is, rule 2 only turns each pair of "b"s into one "b" -- it doesn't apply to "a" or "c". Rule three only turns each single "c" in a string into "cc" -- it doesn't apply to any "a" or "b" in that string.

Here are my solutions to 1-5:

#1
1. abc [input]
2. bca [rule 1 (applied to line 1)]

#2
1. aabbcc [input]
2. aabcc [rule 2 applied to line 1]
3. bbcaa [rule 1 applied to line 2]
4. bcaa [rule 2 applied to line 3]
5. cabb [rule 1 applied to line 4]
6. cab [rule 2 applied to line 5]
7. abc [rule 1 applied to line 6]

#3
1. abdba [input]
2. bcdcb [rule 1 applied to line 1]

#4
1. ada [input]
2. bdb [rule 1 applied to line 1]
3. cdc [rule 1 applied to line 2]
4. ccdcc [rule 3 applied to line 3]
5. ccccdcccc [rule 3 applied to line 4]
6. aaaadaaaa [rule 1 applied to line 5]

#5
1. bbbbbbbb [input]
2. bbbb [rule 2 applied to line 1]
3. bb [rule 2 applied to line 2]
4. b [rule 3 applied to line 3]

11 September.
A reading and a homework.

I will give you on September 9 a follow-up handout on the logical puzzles. I will also post them here. Answers will be due at the beginning of class.

Please read the handout I give you of a passage from Lucretius's On The Nature of Things.

Be prepared to explain, In your own words: how does Lucretius use his atomism to explain magnetism? I'll call on you and make you answer in front of everyone!
Part 3 Representation. Behaviorism. Functionalism. September 16
Please read Rudulph Carnap's "Psychology in Physical Language." There is a version posted here.

Some fun videos of Skinner, the central figure of behaviorism:

Skinner interviewed on reinforcement scheduling -- and free will!

A more general overview, with comparison to Watson


September 23 Please hand in a simple but good attempt to tell a Carnap-style philosophical behaviorist analysis of the following mental sentences:
  1. Human H is angry at object x.
  2. Human H is sad that P. (Here I'm imagining that we aren't usually sad at some object but are sad about some situation; e.g., "Tom is sad that his dog died.")
  3. Human H believes that P. (Again, where P is some sentence, like "Obama is President" or "There is a largest prime number.")
Hey! That last one is unfair! But give it a try and then lets think together when we get together on Wednesday.
Part 4 Representation. The normative problem. Ascriptivism and eliminativism.

September 29
Read "Intentional Systems" by Daniel Dennett, on JSTOR. Reference: Journal of Philosophy, February 1971. While reading, ask yourself:
  • What is the intentional stance?
  • What is the physical stance?
  • What is the design stance?
  • What is a belief, according to Dennett?
  • What is a desire, according to Dennett?
  • How does Dennett's stance "solve" the problem of normativity in representation?
September 30
In three brief passages, describe a mousetrap from (1) the physical stance, (2) the design stance, and then (3) the intentional stance. Hand this in at the beginning of class.
October 2
Read Churchland's Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. Citiation: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 78, No. 2. (Feb., 1981), pp. 67-90. Above is a direct link, which should work on campus. From home, you go to the JSTOR login page and then use the reference information to search. While reading, ask yourself:
  • What's does Churchland mean by asserting that folk psychology is a theory?
  • Is folk psychology a good theory? If not, what are some examples of things it does not explain?
  • How much of folk psychology can we revise, according to Churchland?


Part 6. Representation. Non-reductive physicalism. Davidson's Anomalous Monism.

We're skipping Davidson because time is short. But, if you're interested, please do read Donald Davidson's paper "Mental Events," which is widely available in anthologies or in his collection of papers.

October 9
Semantics vs. Syntax: the Chinese Room.

Two tasks.

(1) Play with a version of Eliza, such as the one here, or a similar program, such as a version of ALICE like the one here.

(2) Read Searle's "Mind, Brains, and Programs", in BBS online. While reading, ask yourself:
  • Can you describe the thought experiment to your roommate?
  • What is the thought experiment meant to show?
  • What is the rule book analogous to?
  • What might this tell us, if correct, about representation and meaning?

Part 7. Consciousness. Inverted Spectra. The Knowledge Argument.

October 12
Start of consciusness. We'll talk about (1) defining phenomenal experience, and also about (2) inverted spectra. Please read Locke Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book 2 Chapter 32 paragraph 15. This is an early inverted spectrum case. There's an online version here.
October 14
Read Jackson's Epiphenomenal Qualia. Citation: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 127. (Apr., 1982), pp. 127-136. From home, you go to the JSTOR login page and then use the reference information to search. While reading, ask yourself:
  • What does Jackson aim to show?
  • What is the Mary thought experiment?
  • What does Jackson claim the Mary thought experiment shows?
  • What is "epiphenomenalism"? Why does his argument, he claims, lead to such a view?



My thoughts on the knowledge argument, which are published in Erkenntnis, are here.

Part 8 Consciousness. The Modal Argument: Kripke's Argument.

24 October
Read the Kripke handout given to you in class.

Part 9. Consciousness. The Gap Argument. Two-Dimensionalism. Zombies.

28 October
Please read David Chalmer's Consciousness and its Place in Nature. This one is tough in spots, but focus on the section on two-dimensionalism. The rest is a good review of the arguments we've seen, plus some other arguments.

Part 10 Emotion Theories. James-Lang Theory. Cognitivism. Affect Program Theory.

4 November
Let's start our discussion of emotion with a classic paper by Williams James. It's on JSTOR, "What is an Emotion?" (Mind, Vol. 9, No. 34 -- April 1884 -- pages 188-205). Please read it closely. It's really very straightfoward, I'm pleased to say. While reading, consider the following questions:
  • What is an emotion, according to James?
  • What arguments does he offer for his view? (E.g., on pages 193-194)

9 November
Exam 1. Due at the beginning of class. Answer three of the following questions.

In each case, you are asked to write in a way that is rigorous, correct, but that is aimed at explaining the issue to your roommate. Thus, for example, bullet lists will be completely unacceptable. Write in complete sentences. If you summarize an argument, which you always should, try to clarify the required premises and the conclusion of the argument. Do not use secondary sources, but you should use primary sources (which means the papers we read, but can also include any other paper by the scholars we read, or any paper in a philosophy journal). It is a good idea to cite parts of the key parts of the arguments in order to clearly show you are capturing them. Cite all quotations properly.

  • What is epiphenomenalism? Contrast it with, say, Descartes interactive substance dualism. What kind of epiphenomenalist is Jackson? Why is Jackson forced into the position of epiphenomenalism by his arguments? Namely, what role does causal closure play in his argument?
  • What is the knowledge argument? Explain the Mary version of the thought experiment. How do we get from the knowledge argument to the conclusion that phenomenal experiences are irreducible to physical information? Do you believe the knowledge argument is a valid argument? A sound argument?
  • What is Kripke's modal argument against reduction of phenomenal experiences? What is epistemic possibility, and why are phenomenal experiences apparently special in regard to epistemic possibility? Give an example of something that is epistemically possible (like Kripke's example: this table could have been made of ice) and explain what this "could" means here. Why, according to Kripke, doesn't this account fit with the case of phenomenal experiences? What do you think about this argument?
  • What is eliminativism? What is Paul Churchland an eliminativist about? That is: what does he recommend that we eliminate? Why is he an eliminativist about that stuff -- that is, what arguments does he offer that the eliminable theory is bad?
  • Explain Dennett's interpretationism. What is it to take the intentional stance? When should you take the intentional stance? What is a belief, according to the intentional systems theory? What is a desire (a motivation) according to intentional systems theory? (Intentional systems theory is the theory we get when we take the intentional stance.)
  • What is interactive substance dualism? What arguments does Descartes offer that mind is a separate substance from the body? Summarize two of these arguments. Could we ever confirm (test) interactive substance dualism? How, if so? What alternatives to dualism are there? Name a few and very briefly describe them.
November 6-13
Read Nash's Cognitive Theories of Emotion. Citation: Nous, Vol. 23, No. 4. (Sep., 1989), pp. 481-504. From home, you go to the JSTOR login page and then use the reference information to search. While reading, ask yourself:
  • What is cognitivism about emotions?
  • Why doubt cognitivism? Why believe it?
  • Can you describe the Ray versus Pat thought experiment
  • What alternative does Nash offer?
Recommended/useful: read the emotion entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy by Ronnie de Sousa. (Note that de Sousa uses the term "feeling theories" differently than I did in class -- I used it for a mythical view attacked by some philosophers that emotions are "just feelings"; de Sousa uses it for the James view. The two are not the same because there is content involved in James theory -- the feelings are caused by a specific kind of perception and are appropriate to it.)

BTW: we tried to define love the other day and failed. Here's Woody Allen's character Fielding in the movie Bananas answering the question, "Can you, like, define the meaning of love?": "What do you mean? It's love. I love you. I want you in a way of cherishing your totality and your otherness and in the sense of a presence and a being and a whole coming and going in a room with grapefruit and a love of a thing, of nature and a sense of not wanting or being jealous of the thing a person possesses."
November 16
We should look at an alternative to cognitivism. Not required but perhaps of interest is a defense of the affect program theory from Passionate Engines which I've posted here. We're not reading Davidson but did read Dennett; here is my criticism of interpretionationist theories of emotion (which are necessarily the strongest form of cognitivist theory of emotion); also very optional!

Part 11 Emotion and the Problem of Fictions: Walton.

18 November
Read Walton, Fearing Fictions. Citation: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 75, No. 1. (Jan., 1978), pp. 5-27. From home, you go to the JSTOR login page and then use the reference information to search. While reading, ask yourself:
Quiz.