PHL471: Philosophy of Mind
Professor: Craig DeLancey
Office: CC217
Email: delancey@oswego.edu



Past Assignments
28 January and therafter: Here's your first assignment: send me a digital head shot, via email to delancey@oswego.edu. Name the file after yourself. For example, you can name it "JoeSmith.jpg." If you don't have a digital camera or don't know anyone who has one, let me know. Thanks! NOTE: I can't know who the photo is of if you send it from your cellphone without adding some kind of text message! -- it arrives with an ID like 1313125736

I. Background on Ontology

28 January: read or review Descartes's Meditation 5 and 6. (If you've not read the Meditations, try to take the time to read them all, in order.) Translations on the web can be found at http://www.classicallibrary.org/descartes/meditations/ and http://www.wright.edu/cola/descartes/mede.html and http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/descartes/meditations/meditations.html. If you feel really motivated, you might peak at Aristotle's De Anima to investigate his perspective. Look at Book II; an online version is this one at MIT.

30 January: HOMEWORK! Descartes identifies a number of reasons he believes that the mind is not a physical thing. Pick the one you think is the best argument. Describe the argument, and then explain why you think it is his best argument. You can do this in one page -- typed please.

6 February: please read the four pages I gave you as a hand-out from Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind (these are the first four pages of the book).

II. Representation

18 February: Intentional inexistence and normativity (we will focus only on the latter). The disjunction problem as an example of the normative problem. Read, before class, the Fodor and Dretske selections I gave you.

20 February: Read "Intentional Systems" by Daniel Dennett, on JSTOR. Reference: Journal of Philosophy, February 1971. While reading, ask yourself:
  • What is the intentional stance?
  • What is the physical stance?
  • What is the design stance?
  • What is a belief, according to Dennett?
  • What is a desire, according to Dennett?
  • How does Dennett's stance "solve" the problem of normativity in representation?

Pop quiz

25 February: read Millikan's "Biosemantics", Journal of Philosophy, 84 (6), 1989. You can skip section 5, if you like. Rush section 1 if it seems unclear.
  • What is the difference between consumption and production of a representation?
  • What does the magnetosome example show?

29 February: read Churchland's Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. Citiation: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 78, No. 2. (Feb., 1981), pp. 67-90. Above is a direct link, which should work on campus. From home, you go to the JSTOR login page and then use the reference information to search. While reading, ask yourself:
  • What's does Churchland mean by asserting that folk psychology is a theory?
  • Is folk psychology a good theory? If not, what are some examples of things it does not explain?
  • How much of folk psychology can we revise, according to Churchland?

5 March: read Searle's famous "Mind, Brains, and Programs", in BBS online. While reading, ask yourself:
  • Can you describe the thought experiment to your roommate?
  • What is the thought experiment meant to show?
  • What is the rule book analogous to?
  • What might this tell us, if correct, about representation and meaning?

12 March: exam 1. Ontology and representation. In class. Topics covered include:
  • Differences between the ontological positions we've discussed (interactive substance dualism, behaviorism, interpretationism, eliminativism). See my table for one view.
  • The nature of the problem of representation. For example, can you explain a version of the disjunction problem suitable for clarifying the problem it shows with the naive causal theory of representation?
  • A basic but sufficient explanation of the view on representation of: Dennett, Millikan, Churchland. Can you explain some strengths and weaknesses of each theory?
  • What is the intentional stance?
  • What does Searle's Chinese Room aim to show?
  • What do magnetosomes represent? According to Millikan? You? What might Dennett say?
  • What reasons does Churchland give for claiming folk psychology may be obsolete as a theory?

II. Emotion

14 March Let's start our discussion of emotion with a classic paper by Williams James. It's on JSTOR, "What is an Emotion?" (Mind, Vol. 9, No. 34 -- April 1884 -- pages 188-205) . Please read it closely. It's really very straightfoward, I'm pleased to say. While reading, consider the following questions:
  • What is an emotion, according to James?
  • What arguments does he offer for his view? (E.g., on pages 193-194)

17 March: read Nash's Cognitive Theories of Emotion. Citation: Nous, Vol. 23, No. 4. (Sep., 1989), pp. 481-504. From home, you go to the JSTOR login page and then use the reference information to search. While reading, ask yourself:
  • What is cognitivism about emotions?
  • Why doubt cognitivism? Why believe it?
  • What alternative does Nash offer?
Recommended/useful: read the emotion entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy by Ronnie de Sousa. (Note that de Sousa uses the term "feeling theories" differently than I did in class -- I used it for a mythical view attacked by some philosophers that emotions are "just feelings"; de Sousa uses it for the James view. The two are not the same because there is content involved in James theory -- the feelings are caused by a specific kind of perception and are appropriate to it.)

19 March: read DeLancey, Passionate Engines chapters 1 and 2. While reading, ask yourself:
  • What are the most plausible criteria we can use to distinguish affects?
  • What is the affect program theory of emotion?
  • What is a cognitive theory of emotion?
  • What reasons are there to doubt cognitivism?
  • What is "weak cognitivism"?
At this point, you want to be able to distinguish the James view and the cognitivist view; and explain what problem with cognitivism Nash is trying to solve.

31 March Hand in your brief phenomenological exercise assignment/homework (handed out on the 18th but available here). I graded this with a 9/10 for any sincere attempt; a 10/10 for some insight. After all, the problem with introspection is I can't tell if you did it correctly. One thing of interest: most of you reported that some conscious inferences were essential causes to your emotion that was analyzed; this points out a problem with James's exercise: one naturally thinks not of affects caused by a non-cognitivist stimulus but rather complex cases in your social life. The thought experiment seems to favor a cognitivst perspective (that of course might be argued to be evidence that cognitivism is true). I noted also that few of you really had much to say about your bodily reactions; that is, few details. Also, many if not most of you were more inclined to a cognitivist theory after the exercise.

31 March: read Davidson, Hume's Cognitive Theory of Pride. Citation: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 73, No. 19, Seventy-Third Annual Meeting Eastern Division, American Philosophical Association. (Nov. 4, 1976), pp. 744-757. From home, you go to the JSTOR login page and then use the reference information to search. While reading, ask yourself:
  • What is pride, according to Davidson?
  • What distinguishes pride from other emotions?
  • Is Davidson a cognitivist?

2 April: read DeLancey, Passionate Engines chapter 3. While reading, ask yourself:
  • What is the most likely theory of emotion for an interpretationist?
  • What is a post-functional action?
  • Why are post-functional actions a problem for interpretationists?

4 April: read Walton, Fearing Fictions. Citation: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 75, No. 1. (Jan., 1978), pp. 5-27. From home, you go to the JSTOR login page and then use the reference information to search. While reading, ask yourself:
  • Why does fearing a fiction make a problem for the cognitivist theory of emotion?
  • What is Walton's solution to this problem?

7 April: in class assignment. While I'm in Arizona, gather together and debate and determine your individual answer for the following question: Can a cognitivist theory of emotion be consistent with the observation that we have emotions for non-existent people and events? If so, how? If not, what's the better alternative?

9 April: write up your individual thoughts in a one-page answer to the question you discussed on Monday, and drop it at the philosophy department office during our class period time. Slide it under my office door if the secretary is not in; just look for the zombie. I graded this with a 5/10 for trying; a 7/10 for getting cognitivism right; and a 10/10 for also getting the apparent conflict in emotions for fictions right.

14 April: read Passionate Engines chapter 6. You will likely find it helpful to read also chapter 5 but that is optional. While reading, ask yourself:
  • What are some alternative solutions to the fearing fiction problem (other than Walton's)?
  • What can clarifying the nature of belief and merely entertaining content allow us to explain?
16 April: start of consciusness. We'll talk about (1) defining phenomenal experience, and also about (2)inverted spectra. Please read Locke Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book 2 Chapter 32 paragraph 15. This is an early inverted spectrum case. There's an online version at:
http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/locke/locke1/Book2c.html#Chapter%20XXXII

18 April: read Jackson's Epiphenomenal Qualia. Citation: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 127. (Apr., 1982), pp. 127-136. From home, you go to the JSTOR login page and then use the reference information to search. While reading, ask yourself:
  • What does Jackson aim to show?
  • What is the Mary thought experiment?
  • What does Jackson claim the Mary thought experiment shows?
  • What is "epiphenomenalism"? Why does his argument, he claims, lead to such a view?

21 April: we'll continue with inverted spectra and consider also Kripke's modal argument. Read Passionate Engines chapter 9; optional is PE chapter 10.

25 April: catching up on consciousness. 2-dimensionalism. Inverted emotions. Read Passionate Engines chapter 9.

28 April: continuing with 2-dimensionalism and inverted emotions. If we have time we'll start on personal identity; please also read the Locke selection, pages 33-52 in John Perry's Personal Identity.

30 April: exam 2. Emotion & Consciousness. In class. Topics include:
  • What is William james's view of the nature of emotion?
  • What is a cognitivist theory of emotion, such as the belief-desire theory, a judgment theory, or the new pure cognitive theory of Nash?
  • What problems might there be with a cognitivist theory of emotions? How might the cognitivist answer those concerns?
  • Why might emoting for fiction pose a problem for the cognitivist theory of emotion?
  • Are the emotions we have for fictions the same kinds that we have for real events? The literature on this is huge -- respond to something recent.
  • What is the knowledge argument? Describe explicitly what the thought experiment with Mary is meant to show.
  • What might inverted spectra show us? If we assume that the prior intension of color is indifferent to mixing up the colors, would you argue that the same is so for emotions -- such as the prior intention of fear versus joy? (That is, compare the inverted color to the inverted emotions thought experiments.)
Here's the actual test:
1. What is William James's theory of emotion? (That is, what is an emotion according to William James?) What evidence does he muster for the theory? Contrast his theory with a cognitivist theory of emotions.

12. A cognitivist view of emotion would typically entail a claim like the following:

To fear x = (to believe that x is dangerous and to desire not to be in danger).

Why is this apparently inconsistent with the fact that we, for example, (appear to) fear some events or objects portrayed in fictions? How might the cognitivist explain our (apparent) emoting for fictions? Consider at least two possible responses by the cognitivist.

3. What is the knowledge argument? Describe explicitly Frank Jackson's thought experiment with Mary, and explain what it is meant to show. Aim to be able to tease a clear and valid argument out of his (mostly implicit) premises.

4. What are "inverted spectra"? What might our intuition that inverted spectra are possible show us about phenomenal experiences? How might it show that?

Grading. I graded using the following standards.
1. A. Clear statement of the theory, with identity conditions clear 4 pts. B. Clear statement of James's primary evidence/argument for the view 4 pts. C. Contrast with cognitivism 3 pts.

2. A. Clear identification of the contradiction involved 5 pts. B. First cognitivist response 3 pts. C. Second cognitivist response 2 pts.

3. A. Clear description of experiment with identification that Mary knows relevant theory 5 pts. B. Conclusion of the argument summarized correctly 3 pts. C. Clarity in schematizing the argument 2 pts.

4. A. Proper description of the inverted spectra experiment 4 pts. B. Explanation of how the possibility denies necessity of causal role for color experience 3 pts. C. Explanation of how thought experiment connects the possibility with the causal role, 3 pts.

Note: we're not planning on a final paper, but rather just a final exam. If anyone wants to write a final paper, however, I would be delighted to work with that person and we can do so. But pending such a request from you, your grade will be computed as a curve, weighted 40% for the three homeworks and one pop quiz, and 60% evenly for the three exams.

2 May: read Quinton selection, pages 53-72 in John Perry's Personal Identity. Focus on sections 2 and 3 (pages 58-67). While reading, ask yourself:
  • Where does Quiton's view differ from Locke's?
  • Where is Quiton's view similar to Locke's?
  • Which one of those guys is B and which one is C, anyways?
5 May: read Butler selection, pages 99-105 in John Perry's Personal Identity.

7 May: read Hume selection, pages 159-176 in John Perry's Personal Identity. Optional: Passionate Engines chapter 8.

9 May: read Nagel's paper, "Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness," which is collected in John Perry's Personal Identity.

12 May: exam 3. All material, but focussing upon personal identity. In class, 10:30 a.m. - 12:30 p.m. There will be some multiple choice questions, and then some short answer questions. Personal identity questions, and other questions, might concern such issues as:
  • Why is there a problem of personal identity? That is, why isn't it just obvious that I am me, that you are you?
  • What is a person for Locke? What makes a person the same person during a period of conscious awareness? What links this person over periods when consciousness ends or is interrupted?
  • What kind of problems do split brain patients raise for our thinking about the self? Why might they lead one to worry about whether there are several selves?
  • Complete the following equation:
    Mental state M = ....
    For the following ontological theories. Where M is a kind of mental state: behaviorism, reductive physicalism, functionalism, interpretationism/ascriptivism/the-intentional-stance. Where M is an instance of a mental state: non-reductive physicalism. Where M is a kind of emotion: cognitivism, Jamesian theory, the affect program theory. Where M is a person (over time): the memory theory.
Grading. I graded the three questions of the final in the following way. (1) A. Explanation of why there is a problem of personal identity, 2.5. B. Proper statement of Locke's definition of a person, 2.5. C. Proper explanation of continuity of consciousness as first criterion of identity, 2.5. D. Proper explanation of memory links as sencond criterion of identity, 2.5. (2) A. Explanation of split brains, 1.5. B. Problem they pose for self, 3. C. Solutions that Nagel considers, 1.5+1.5. D. Explanation of Nagel's skeptical conclusion, 2.5. (3) A. Proper statement of cognitivism, 3. B. Proper statement of the problem for music, 3. C. Solution, 2. D. overall discussion, 2.

Please note, some few of us did fine on the exams, but skipped two or more of the assignments, and your final grade was substantially reduced because of that.