PHL471: Philosophy of Mind
Professor: Craig DeLancey
I do not accept homeworks by email!
"The Mind's Best Trick."
Lead: Alessandro Trimarchi.
Tentative assignments (these will change substantially)
Exam and papers due.
Papers: before 5:00 p.m. at my office in hard copy.
Final exam: 10:30 a.m. - 12:30 p.m. in Campus Center
142. Questions could include (but not be limited to):
- What are: interactive substance dualism;
physicalistic reduction; eliminativism; functionalism;
behaviorism; interpretationism; epiphenomenalism?
- What is William James's view of the nature of
- What is a cognitivist theory of emotion, such as
the belief-desire theory, a judgment theory, or the new
pure cognitive theory of Nash?
- What problems might there be with a cognitivist
theory of emotions (other than emoting for fictions)?
How might the cognitivist answer those concerns?
- Why might emoting for fiction pose a problem for
the cognitivist theory of emotion?
- What is the Knowledge Argument? What is it
meant to show? Describe Jackson's thought experiment.
- What are the modal arguments? What are they
meant to show?
- Why is there a problem of personal identity? That
is, why isn't it just obvious that you are
you, now and before?
- What is a person for Locke? What makes a person
the same person during a period of conscious awareness?
What links this person over periods when consciousness
ends or is interrupted?
- What is Hume's criticism of personal identity claims
- What kind of problems do split brain patients raise
for our thinking about the self? Why might they lead
one to worry about whether there are several selves?
- What two examples for externalism do Clark and Chalmers
offer. What four criteria do they propose for something
external to count as part of the cognitive system?
- Why does the Soon et al result, and other results like
it, cast doubt on our common sense view of free action?
Explain that common sense view, explain their results, and
show the apparent inconsistency between the two.