PHL471: A Summary of Ontological Positions

A Summary of Ontological Positions

A rough summary of the views we've seen.

As I've said, I believe that both "physicalism" and "materialism" are nearly useless terms. In most of the discussion we are having, and in the papers we are reading, we instead are typically starting with the assumption that we have a body of very productive and useful theory (that includes things like physics and chemistry and so on), and we're wondering how these strange mental phenomena, for which we have as yet no full explanation, might fit (if at all) with that body of theory.

Thus, I use "physical" here as a gloss. I use "physical" here to stand in for something like "of the kinds that are described in our best (scientific) theories."

Theory Description Simplistic Example of a Reduction Case Example Philosopher Note
Interactive Substance Dualism Mind and body (extended stuff) are two different kinds of substances that do interact casually. Substances are kinds of beings that can exist without other kinds. For Descartes, there can be minds without bodies, and bodies without minds. (Mental event m is a different type of thing than is any physical event p, and vice versa; thus:) Mental kind pain = some specific kind of mental event, which is not any physical event (and could in principle exist without any physical state). Descartes Substance dualism without interactivism includes parallelism (the two substances act in ways that, typically through the grace of god, are miraculously seemingly interacting).
Philosophical Behaviorism Mental state terms and descriptions are translatable without significant loss of utility into some behavioral state terms or descriptions. (One might say, minds are behaviors, but some philosophical behaviorists believe we should avoid talking as if there is a thing, mind.) human pain = the increased likelihood of a human to withdraw, to say "ouch," to undergo certain autonomic changes, etc. Ryle Philosophical behaviorism is distinct from psychological behaviorism both by the linkage with a focus on language, and also a presupposition that (almost) all our mental state talk can be saved and translated into behavioral talk.
Psychological Behaviorism Some of what we call mental eventss are predispositions to kinds of behavior. Or: some mental terms and descriptions are translatable to some behavioral event terms or descriptions. human pain = the increased likelihood of a human to withdraw, to say "ouch," to undergo certain autonomic changes, etc. Watson, Skinner The feature that distinguishes psychological from philosophical behaviorism is both an openness to the idea that we might introduce new mental or behavioral terms; or revise some of those that we have; and that we may eliminate some of our mental terms as unsalveagable.
Type Identity Theory Some mental kinds are physical kinds [mental kind] pain = [physical kind] such and such neurons firing Smart, Place Types may be of varying specificity. Some might for example think that there are physical types across species for a mental type like pain (e.g., all animal pains are the same kind of mental state, and identical to the same kind of brain state). Others might construe the kind more narrowly; e.g., supposing that a kind like pain is specific to, say, a species, so that human pain would be identical only to a physical kind found in humans.
Token Identity Theory Some mental events are physical events (but for some of these mental events there is no kind that is also a physical kind) [mental event instance] pain of organism x at time t = [physical event instance] such and such neurons firing in organism x at time t Davidson, Dennett Note that type identity theory would entail token identity; so, when a theory is called a token identity theory it is typically assumed that it is not a type identity theory. Token identity theory typically depends upon some notion of multiple realizability.
Functionalism Some mental events are physical events, which can be identified by the functional role they play in a functional system. pain of organism x = physical event (probably a brain event) that plays such and such a functional role in leading the organism to withdraw, to say "ouch," to have certain autonomic changes, etc. (We would ultimately describe the functional role in terms of the relation of this physical event to other physical events that have also their own functional roles; functions are products of a network of such relations.) The important difference from behaviorism, which must be stressed, is that there is a state which is causing the relevant behavior, which has the relevant relationships, etc. In behaviorism, the behaviors stand alone and we posit no such state. It is debatable, and depends on details, whether functionalism is a token or type identity theory. The functional states referred to are types, but whether those functional types need to be physical types is a complex issue. Most assume it is in this regard a token identity theory. The primary inspiration for this view is the computer; software states are excellent examples of functional states.
Eliminativism Some mental state terms do not properly refer to anything. They are superstitions, like ascribing an illness to demon possession. [For example, assuming eliminativism about belief] There is no thing x such that x = belief that P. Rorty and Churchland on some propositional attitudes, some behaviorists for some mental state terms Restriction of the domain to be eliminated is carefully done by eliminativists. It would be a parody to say they eliminate the mind.

	Theory Description	Simplistic Example of a Reduction Case	Example Philosopher	Note
Interactive Substance Dualism	Mind and body (extended stuff) are two different kinds of substances that do interact casually. Substances are kinds of beings that can exist without other kinds. For Descartes, there can be minds without bodies, and bodies without minds.	(Mental event m is a different type of thing than is any physical event p, and vice versa; thus:) Mental kind pain = some specific kind of mental event, which is not any physical event (and could in principle exist without any physical state).	Descartes	Substance dualism without interactivism includes parallelism (the two substances act in ways that, typically through the grace of god, are miraculously seemingly interacting).
Philosophical Behaviorism	Mental state terms and descriptions are translatable without significant loss of utility into some behavioral state terms or descriptions. (One might say, minds are behaviors, but some philosophical behaviorists believe we should avoid talking as if there is a thing, mind.)	human pain = the increased likelihood of a human to withdraw, to say "ouch," to undergo certain autonomic changes, etc.	Ryle	Philosophical behaviorism is distinct from psychological behaviorism both by the linkage with a focus on language, and also a presupposition that (almost) all our mental state talk can be saved and translated into behavioral talk.
Psychological Behaviorism	Some of what we call mental eventss are predispositions to kinds of behavior. Or: some mental terms and descriptions are translatable to some behavioral event terms or descriptions.	human pain = the increased likelihood of a human to withdraw, to say "ouch," to undergo certain autonomic changes, etc.	Watson, Skinner	The feature that distinguishes psychological from philosophical behaviorism is both an openness to the idea that we might introduce new mental or behavioral terms; or revise some of those that we have; and that we may eliminate some of our mental terms as unsalveagable.
Type Identity Theory	Some mental kinds are physical kinds	[mental kind] pain = [physical kind] such and such neurons firing	Smart, Place	Types may be of varying specificity. Some might for example think that there are physical types across species for a mental type like pain (e.g., all animal pains are the same kind of mental state, and identical to the same kind of brain state). Others might construe the kind more narrowly; e.g., supposing that a kind like pain is specific to, say, a species, so that human pain would be identical only to a physical kind found in humans.
Token Identity Theory	Some mental events are physical events (but for some of these mental events there is no kind that is also a physical kind)	[mental event instance] pain of organism x at time t = [physical event instance] such and such neurons firing in organism x at time t	Davidson, Dennett	Note that type identity theory would entail token identity; so, when a theory is called a token identity theory it is typically assumed that it is not a type identity theory. Token identity theory typically depends upon some notion of multiple realizability.
Functionalism	Some mental events are physical events, which can be identified by the functional role they play in a functional system.	pain of organism x = physical event (probably a brain event) that plays such and such a functional role in leading the organism to withdraw, to say "ouch," to have certain autonomic changes, etc. (We would ultimately describe the functional role in terms of the relation of this physical event to other physical events that have also their own functional roles; functions are products of a network of such relations.)		The important difference from behaviorism, which must be stressed, is that there is a state which is causing the relevant behavior, which has the relevant relationships, etc. In behaviorism, the behaviors stand alone and we posit no such state. It is debatable, and depends on details, whether functionalism is a token or type identity theory. The functional states referred to are types, but whether those functional types need to be physical types is a complex issue. Most assume it is in this regard a token identity theory. The primary inspiration for this view is the computer; software states are excellent examples of functional states.
Eliminativism	Some mental state terms do not properly refer to anything. They are superstitions, like ascribing an illness to demon possession.	[For example, assuming eliminativism about belief] There is no thing x such that x = belief that P.	Rorty and Churchland on some propositional attitudes, some behaviorists for some mental state terms	Restriction of the domain to be eliminated is carefully done by eliminativists. It would be a parody to say they eliminate the mind.